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1. Introduction
In part I, we deﬁned the trace as the singular building block of
pertinent information about a crime and crime series and we
described an important role that forensic science has to play
besides its end product as court evidence: as an integral part of an
intelligence-led managerial philosophy. The potential of traces in
this perspective has been demonstrated, at the very least, for
linking entities, which itself is a basic function of crime
intelligence.
In this second part, we will consider crime scene processing
within this framework. This activity consists in collecting data that
feed different processes. The collection of data is the object of great
attention in typical intelligence processes: it must be selective,
timely, and planned according to the relevancy and accessibility of
data, as well as the availability of resources. The collection plan is
systematically updated in function of new knowledge and needs.
Crime intelligence is thus fed by this data. It then drives the system
by inﬂuencing priorities and deployment of resources as well as
determining new informational needs according to a variety of
security objectives. As a corollary, crime scene processing should
be directly inﬂuenced by such processes.
This view contrasts with how crime scene examination is
considered in the traditional justice-oriented conception. In most
jurisdictions around the world, crime scene examination is carried
out under police responsibility and resources are limited. The
actual task of crime scene examination or processing is undertaken
by crime scene examiners, who themselves are sworn or non-
sworn police ofﬁcers.1 They are generally trained to follow very
normative quality assurance procedures in order to detect,
recognise and, if necessary, collect the ‘‘best’’ quality and quantity
of traces. However, performance indicators seem to show very
disparate outcomes between crime scene investigators across
different institutions or even within the same crime scene unit [1–
7]. Despite frequently deﬁned standard operating procedures,
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most of the work at the scene, qualitatively and quantitatively,
seems to be mainly inﬂuenced by individual attitudes. Beyond
workload, factors such as personal knowledge and interests,
individual ability to recognise relevant traces, aswell as conﬁdence
between partners and awareness are assumed to play a
predominant role [2,4–6,8,9]. Part of the explanation may be
related to the fact that procedures are rarely if ever, focussed on
intelligence or investigation but remain within a narrow indivi-
dualisation and court oriented paradigm. There is a confusion
resulting from a lack of mutual comprehension between police
searching to meet, often implicitly, their needs in terms of
investigation and security through policing models and intelli-
gence processes (mainly security-oriented), and how the forensic
science community conceives its role (mainly court/justice-
oriented). This confusion is crystallised by the fact that procedures
for investigating crime scenes do not clearly separate factors that
serve security objectives or investigation, and basic principles
oriented towards more traditional views of forensic science (i.e.
mainly gathering evidence for court purposes). This is particularly
evident when considering manuals dedicated to non-forensic
personnel (e.g. [10]) that prescribe how to view a crime scene
without considering, more holistically, the constraints faced by
actors of a policing model.
This paper starts by clarifying the uncomfortable position of the
crime scene examiner operating within an often implicit complex
dual situation delineated by justice and security objectives. An
example relates the actual treatment of a speciﬁc series of
burglaries which has developed in Switzerland. It illustrates how
intelligence aspects have been effectively used, ignored or have not
reached crime scene investigators in the follow-up of the case.
From this basis, the forensic science literature and recommenda-
tions resulting from a number of reports and research projects will
be mentioned in order to explain how crime scene investigation is
now conceivedwithin the forensic science community, andwhat it
considers as desirable progresses.
From this background, we discuss why we consider that the
path suggested by the forensic science community for improving
the current situation is misleading, at least from a security
perspective. In order to propose an intelligence-based conception,
crucial points of decisions will be identiﬁed. They explicit the
diversity of factors that inﬂuence how the police process crime
scenes. This leads us to propose a possible general framework
based on crime and forensic intelligence. This new framework
takes into account intelligence factors and consideration of the
immediate social and physical environment to lead to an efﬁcient
but modiﬁed view of forensic science and crime scene investiga-
tion.
2. Example
Let’s consider an example of a series of burglaries that occurred
between 2006 and 2008 in a speciﬁc region in Switzerland. Links
between many cases came to light as the same DNA proﬁle was
reported in a number of cases. This DNA proﬁle remained
unidentiﬁed because its source was not in the national database
(CODIS system). At the time, no speciﬁc measure nor any crime
analysiswas deemed necessary, especially since no intelligence-led
structure or intelligence policy was in place in that particular law
enforcement agency. The information was simply passed on to
ﬁeld investigators in case someone is apprehended and his or her
DNA would become available for comparison (reactive attitude).
Because of the lack of knowledge of the criminal and immediate
environments, each burglary was treated as an isolated case and
crime scene processing was usually processed routinely. This went
on despite the fact that the modus operandi of this series was
relatively speciﬁc (same targets, night time, speciﬁc locations, etc.,
i.e. considerations on the immediate environment). Knowledge of
the physical environment nevertheless led to the systematic DNA
swabbing of the extracted door lock cylinders (when left on the
scene) or around the door lock (when taken away). This was
supported by the fact that there is a high detection rate of DNA in
such circumstances and it was conﬁrmed by the number of cases in
this series that were ultimately linked through DNA proﬁles.
A year later (2007), this series was still active. In one burglary,
the victim disturbed the burglars and a chase and ﬁght followed
(considerations on the immediate environment). The victim stated
that the burglars were three. Later on, the DNA proﬁle revealed on
the door lock was found to be the same as in the previous cases
belonging to this series (let’s call it proﬁle burglar no. 1). This was
the ﬁrst indication that this series of burglaries was committed not
by a single burglar but probably by a group of three. Despite this
new information, subsequent cases belonging to this series were
still treated as individual events (lack of crime analysis). In some
cases, scenes were not even attended (strategic considerations). In
early 2008, the series continued and, once again, the same DNA
proﬁle was retrieved from door locks. But no forensic traces of the
other two burglars were found, mainly because they were never
looked for (lack of intelligence used at the scene). In one case, a
partial DNA proﬁle was retrieved on a door lock but quality criteria
did not allow its introduction into the national database
(insufﬁcient number of loci to be introduced in CODIS), although
it could have been used for pointing to potential suspects: DNA
comparisons were asked between this DNA trace and the DNA
proﬁles of other known burglars that were active at the time. But
no matching DNA proﬁle could be found. These known speciﬁc
burglars had indeed nothing to do with this series (lack of
knowledge of the criminal environment). Much later, once the series
was identiﬁed and thoroughly studied, a DNA comparison was
asked between the partial proﬁle and the proﬁle of burglar no. 1
and it was found to be a match (use of intelligence).
This highlights that knowledge of the criminal environment is not
only useful in the decision for attending the scene and how to
process it, but it can provide valuable information regarding the
exploitation of traces usually processed for identiﬁcation purposes
as a linkage agent.
Finally, in one of the cases, a jewel boxwhich had probably been
moved by one of the burglars was searched for ﬁngerprints and an
identiﬁable ﬁngermark was detected (situational and physical
considerations). A name provided by the national ﬁngerprint
database (AFIS system) associated the mark to a ﬁnger of a man
previously charged with burglaries. Following investigation, this
led to the arrest of this known burglar and two accomplices who
included burglar no. 1. This brought the series to an end. The case is
summarised in Fig. 1.
This example showsmany possible uses of forensic case data for
investigation and crime analysis, as well as how contextual
information can be used in order to detect traces.
It also highlights how difﬁcult it is to detect and identify series
of burglaries or other types of high volume crimes when they are
perpetrated over a long period of time. Indeed, they get diluted in
the cloud of all other cases and without a dedicated crime analysis
unit, the risk is high that theywill remain undetected. On the other
hand, if the series is committed during a very short period of time,
then the higher the chances that it will be detected, even if the
policy and structure of the police force is not intelligence-led.
It appears that DNA linking integrated into crime analysis
would have helped to select relevant crime scene work in the
context of this series. The case actually made signiﬁcant advances
because of tacit information exchanges and individual initiatives.
This kind of reasoning generally does not appear in standard
operating procedures, neither for crime scene examination, nor for
crime analysis.
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This is however a very traditional way of dealing with such
series. There is generally a very limited view on the relative
importance of crime series. Linkage blindness of many forms
[11,12] hampers obtaining the global view necessary for making
decisions and anticipating informational needs. Similar treatments
seem repetitive, and largely across organisations [9,13]. In this
example, we have already sketched some more general notions
that will ground our further proposition. However, before
presenting a generalmodel, wemust consider if current evolutions
in the ﬁeld of crime scene examination follow a path that will tend
to correct these evident weaknesses.
3. Main tendencies
Crime scene processing is at the crux of the forensic science
pioneers’ works of the early parts of the 20th Century [14–16].
Since then, and for the largest part of the last Century, the forensic
science focus moved on to technology and laboratory processes
despite calls by Kirk already in 1963 that major innovations will
not come from technology, but science.2 However, there has been
recently a resurgence of interest in crime scene and many authors
have revisited this topic along with some of the fundamental
concepts such as Locard’s exchange principle [4,5].
Beside this theoretical background, the practice itself renewed
its focus on crime scene. The main reason can be understood by
examining the current major overlapping trends in this area. These
trends are described below.
3.1. Increased efforts for measuring the efﬁciency of crime scene
examination
Whether or not crime scene examination is carried out within a
police environment, there is an increasing interest to quantify the
quality and efﬁciency of the work, as well as promoting more
targeted crime attendance. These managerial pressures impact on
training and recruitment strategies, as well as decision making at
various levels. But police and forensic laboratoriesmaydiffer in their
objectives, which explains why their practices may be diverse.
As a result, the scientiﬁc support for dealing with crime scene
performance is still unsatisfactory. When they exist, indicators
often focus on activity (e.g. number of crime scenes attended)
rather than on outcomes (e.g. number of crimes detected) [1]. This
emphasises the confusion that exists as towhat the real outcomeof
crime scene examiners should be. This appears through the variety
of poorly formalised objectives forensic case data may serve.
Fig. 1. Chronological development of the series. This is a very traditional treatment of series by strictly following standard operating procedures. It is clearly noticeable that
very early, beyond the use of successes obtained by swabbing doors locks, knowledgewas available (pieces of knowledge are represented by circles) for improving awareness
on the series, improving its treatment and targeting the effort. These weaknesses are represented by grey circles. The example also illustrates how forensic intelligence
considerations (door lock, situational perspective and forensic links), more often than not, suffer from information silos created by the organisation.
2 ‘‘In short, there exists in the ﬁeld of criminalistics a serious deﬁciency in basic
theory and principles, as constrasted with the large assortment of effective
technical procedures’’ Kirk, P.L., The Ontogeny of Criminalistics. The Journal of
Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 54 (1963) 235.
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3.2. Signiﬁcant changes in recruiting models
In recent years, a number of police services around the world
have moved towards civilianisation for some of their most
specialised units, including crime scene. In general, in this model
university graduates are recruited and fast-tracked in their
training so they can undertake crime scene work without the
requirement to undertake extensive traditional police training (e.g.
Police Academy). This solution often results from a cost–beneﬁt
analysis. In some jurisdictions, like in the Australian State of New
South Wales, crime scenes are processed by sworn or non-sworn
ofﬁcers, depending on whether the scene relates to serious or high
volume crime. From both training and operational viewpoints,
these changes have prompted the need for a more formalised
approach to crime scene, but mainly oriented towards the process
of providing evidence for courts.
3.3. Development and generalisation of quality assurance systems
Over the last 15 years, the forensic science profession shifted
towards the development of more standardised protocols gener-
ated by a more structured framework. This trend is currently
further developed through personnel certiﬁcation. If formal quality
management and accreditation are now widely accepted in
forensic science laboratories around the world, the question
remains as to how best they can be applied to crime scene work. In
a number of countries, the tendency has been so far to accredit
laboratories for tests with ISO/IEC 17025 without considering
crime scene units. However, a recent trend to address this issue is
currently emerging. For example, in Australia, crime scene units
are now accredited to ISO 17025, whereas within the European
Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI), there is an initiative
to establish guidelines for crime scene based on ISO/IEC 17020
[17]. Creating speciﬁc actual standards for crime scene accredita-
tion still remains a possibility, but levels of generality of formal
procedures is the object of a hot debate, because, when the
formalisation is exaggerated, theymay lead to routine applications
that hamper to considerate the singular nature of each scene as
such. This situation creates a fertile ground to review the way
crime scene’s work is approached.
However, accreditation raises also many issues about the cost
and the generated business of certiﬁcation, the legitimacy for
private companies to control State procedures, and the way
procedures take into account (or ignore) intelligence and
investigative aspects.
3.4. Scientiﬁc and technological developments
The emergence of new technology (e.g. DNA) and the strong
development of advanced analytical techniques over the last 20
years provided increased opportunities for traces collected from
crime scene to be exploited. This situation catalysed the famous
‘laboratory backlog’ which actuallywould be best deﬁned as ‘triage
backlog’. More importantly, this situation also highlights the
importance of being selective in the collection and exploitation of
traces and that of using techniques that are ‘ﬁt for purpose’. For
example, some authors have clearly stated that more ﬁeld-based
testing, with a better selection of samples for full laboratory
analysis, will go a long way towards addressing this backlog
[18,19]. In this respect, knowledge of possibilities and limitations
of working selectively on scenes (this implies speciﬁc scientiﬁc
competencies) should allow to highlight the range of information
content that can be gained from the scene. The study of inference
structures drawn at the scene is critical in this perspective [20].
Moreover, better review processes within investigative agencies
would help prioritise laboratory operations or remove useless
treatments from the queue, for instance when cases have already
been detected through other substantive evidence.
3.5. Occurrence of large scale incidents and the need for fast forensic
responses
In the last decade, a number of large scale incidents and/or acts
of terrorism occurred around the world, September 11, 2001, the
two Bali bombings (2002–2005) and the Indian Ocean tsunami
(2004) being dramatic examples of such incidents. These incidents
highlighted the existence of a tension between the need to provide
fast information leads and the somewhat slower traditional
forensic response that is mainly designed for court purposes.
Accepting the premise that late information is useless, the concept
that a trade off may exist between completeness (precision,
accuracy, value of rough but quality information) and timeliness
started to emerge. These ideaswere presented byAlmog at Interpol
conferences at least from1989, and supported by other authors, for
example Robertson [19].
This is not only true for serious crime and salient events. Rapid
reporting is seen as a key aspect for the efﬁcient treatment of
manifold types of crime. Traces such as ﬁngerprints or DNA
transfer traces are rapidly searched, collected, analysed and
compared with reference material collated in national databases,
for exclusion purposes, or directlywith suspects. Their analyses are
generally expected to point to the identity of the person at the
source of any of the traces and thus give rapidly a new direction for
the investigation.
Rapid response time is typically a sign that there is a need for
using forensic case data in the early stages of an investigation. It
may also be the case that the dramatic rise and even change of scale
of the number of people controlled by biometric systems will
generate a new demand for a rapid elimination of false positives.
This is compounded also by the evolution in criminal law
procedures that increasingly require more rapid decisions in
relation to cases when individuals are deprived of their civil rights
(e.g. individuals under arrest). The relevance of this dimension is
also illustrated by the apparent increasing demand from police
investigators and/or public prosecutors for fast information in
order to help them take informed decisions, such as to pursue the
investigation or not.
For example, in one drug-related case, the investigators
observed an inconsistency between the amount of drug delivered
and the price paid, the latter being too high. Therefore, two
alternative hypotheses were formulated by the investigators:
either the buyers were expecting another delivery or the purity of
the drug was very high which would explain the price difference.
Thus, the investigators needed an immediate result of the chemical
analysis in order to determine if they would have to target another
delivery or not. If yes, additional investments in resources (phone
tappings, surveillance, etc.) would be required. This particular
example shows the importance of a rapid, almost immediate
forensic response which allows the chief investigator to make a
timely informed decision. It is thus more important to obtain a
result in a matter of 1 or 2 days, even if rough but relevant and
dependable, than a very precise, may be too detailed in regards
with the question asked and the decision to be taken, and accurate
result in a formal report after many weeks or months.
Another example comes from DNA proﬁling which is now used
routinely for most types of crime. In Switzerland, the maximum
delay set for the laboratory to obtain a DNA proﬁle from a trace is
set by legislation.3 However, there is no legally required timeframe
for reporting the result. Thus, for high volume crimes, such as
3 12 days, in accordance with Ordinance of the Federal Department of Justice and
Police on DNA laboratories of June 29, 2005, art. 2, al. 4c, RS 363.11.
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burglaries, where samples are gathered together for a certain time
period and results are collated into one general report, the delay
can be as long as 2months. This delay is too long for some cases and
informal results are communicated at an earlier stage in order to
assist with the investigation. In these two examples, traces, as
relevant information, are used in a completely different decision
making process compared to what is required for court purposes.
As it stands, this aspect remains very poorly formalised and poorly
understood within the criminal justice system, if not sometimes
hidden behind the formal needs and contradictory procedures that
belong to the judicial process. Consequently, it may occur that
results of traces evaluations in these immediate circumstances are
transmitted as evidence in court; when in fact, the latter follows a
different decision making process. This may lead to great
confusions, and technology, by itself, will not help to clarify this
situation.
This fundamental gap is epitomised by strategies and agendas
which favour technology as the ultimate solution, like, for example,
the development of technological forensic toolbox that has been
prioritised in European security research programs.4
3.6. Reaction to the relative isolation of forensic science laboratories
Over the years, forensic science laboratory processes became
increasingly more specialised and more complex. As a result, the
laboratories themselves became increasingly more isolated from
the crime scene and from the investigation. To address this issue,
many jurisdictions have introduced the position of crime scene
coordinators who generally are laboratory scientists attending the
crime scene in the more serious cases. By this approach,
laboratories should also extend their services: there is an increased
recognition that, on each incident, physical traces, by their
presence or absence can be of a crucial importance already in
the early phase of the investigation. Many of these uses are
unlikely to lead to actual evidence, but they may clarify what
happened, help determine priorities, and signiﬁcantly contribute
to the detection process. Proximity between investigators and
forensic scientist is recognised to be crucial in this perspective, but
difﬁcult to implement in the current dominant paradigm.
Occasionally, these new ‘‘specialists’’ are working within a
police environment or act in close collaboration with the police
who request such support. Such crime scene coordinators assist
with the holistic management of the case. Although the creation of
such a position can be seen as a move towards some kind of
intelligence framework, it is fair to say that it is essentially a
reactive solution to the ‘‘scene vs. laboratory’’ fragmentation and
remains mostly oriented towards the speciﬁc needs of the
laboratories. Conversely, the distance between forensic labora-
tories and the police is also often seen as desirable by some in order
to avoid the inﬂuence of the police context when criminal cases are
scientiﬁcally processed [21]. The whole system seems to hesitate
between organisational separation, connexion or integration of
tasks between different communities, each solution showing pros
and cons in relation to the diversity of tasks to be carried out and to
the variety of existing decisionmaking processes. There is clearly a
need to separate consideration about information system, the
logical nature of processes, and the way they are organised to
address the confusion that currently prevails.
4. Attending and processing the scene: the diversity
From the introduction, it is understood that the approach to
crime scene work and its actual delivery are very diverse. This has
been stated by many empirical studies [1,3–7,9,13]. In general,
serious crime (e.g. homicide) results in the systematic and often
exhaustive deployment of major police resources, while interven-
tion in the context of high volume crime (e.g. break and enter)
shows a greater variety of, often tacit, strategies and practices. This
variety can be identiﬁed before, during and after crime scene
processing. In other words, at least three levels of diversity can be
distinguished, namely:
Strategy applied: original decision to attend the scene or not,
case prioritisation, human and institutional resources allocated
will depend on the case. For instance, inﬂuential factors can be
the extent and nature of the territory covered (e.g. metropolitan
vs. country areas), and time needed to attend crime scenes;
style of policing: response to public expectations, the promo-
tion of the image of the police or the decision to intensify the
ﬁght against certain types of crimes.
Crime scene processing: a variety of methods and procedures for
crime scene searching and recording (from selective to
complete) exist, as well as for delineating the levels of use of
technologies (from cutting-edge to simple technology).
Information gathered and exploited: traces are collected,
examined, and compared for immediate use or stored for
future comparisons. They are examined in order to feed
different processes.
These types of decision making processes occur in every
system. But, in the forensic science context, they are imple-
mented under a great variety of models of organisations and
management. The latter ranges from small to big organisations;
from an integration of most forensic science services within one
police service to their separation; from an integration of
laboratories and crime scene examination units to a strict
separation; from the separation of specialised crime scene units
to the integration of all kinds of crime scene examinations, from
basic police training to specialised scientiﬁc education. All these
forms of organisation will inﬂuence the proximity of parts of the
activities to some speciﬁc exploitation process: everyday formal
or informal meetings between scene of crime specialists and
investigators will implicitly or explicitly favour investigative-led
strategies, while external forensic science laboratories will be
more concerned by delivering services to customers in a more
distant and formalised way. This evidently results to other forms
of decision making processes to cover the three levels
mentioned above.
5. Crime scene examination within its environment
We have shown that managerial, organisational, methodolo-
gical and technological dimensions inﬂuence crime scene exam-
ination. Moreover, a great diversity exists in the way such models
are implemented (investigation collidingwith court’s needs, sworn
vs. civilian, centralisation vs. decentralisation, laboratory divide,
etc.). Finally, the search for the ideal model seems to be confronted
to a series of basic, often implicit, contradictions that cause the
pendulum to balance according to the solution of short terms
preoccupations, instead of being identiﬁed in line with a long-term
and coherent strategy.
Themodel we propose capitalises on the view presented in part
I and is resolutely connected to an intelligence-led strategy. It
makes explicit that a speciﬁc policing model inﬂuences crime
scene examination and it is crucial to recognise the impact of this
inﬂuence.
At this point, it is valid to ask the question whether such a
model may introduce a bias in the scientist’s judgements. This
critical point has motivated most of the recommendations for
4 European commission, seventh framework program: http://cordis.europa.eu/
fp7/ (last access 12th October 2009).
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separating forensic activities from the inﬂuence of police
organisations, so far. For this reason, it is discussed further below.
5.1. A priori knowledge and critical thinking
When envisaging using intelligence in order to guide decision
making for crime scene examination, a priori knowledge is
necessarily at the core of the suggested process. It must be
accepted that it provokes a context effect that may channel
reasoning processes. It is now well recognised that an inappropri-
ate attitude can lead to a skewed process (e.g. one only sees what
one expects to see).5 This tension, when processing a crime scene,
should be controlled by a framework based on a hypothetico-
deductive reasoning process such as we advocate for, which
implicitly includes abduction by imagining potential causes to
observations under accepted general rules or laws (see Fig. 2).
Contextual elements must be used in the selection process on
the scene of the investigation. Detection and observations high-
light the presence of traces whose signiﬁcance may be tested
through alternative hypotheses at different levels. The assessment
of hypotheses, and possibilities to predict what should be observed
if one hypothesis is true, lead to reject, obtain more conﬁdence in
the hypothesis or to the need to recover new specimens. This
creates a cycle that lasts until hypotheses are discriminated by
successive series of tests. Eventually hypotheses are aggregated to
form a list of probable scenarios or causes. It is not always themore
‘‘probable’’ hypothesis that guides priorities: when attending a
scene that is presented as a suicide, the hypothesis of the homicide
should be systematically the most carefully envisaged.
This is a proposal for minimising the undesirable effects of a
priori knowledge that channels reasoning processes. This is only a
speciﬁc illustration of how critical thinking should form the core of
intelligence and investigative reasoning processes [22]. Thismeans
adopting an attitude of awareness that encourages the examiner to
go beyond a preconception or common sense. But, at the same
time, it also accepts the proper integration of available knowledge
that exists in relation to the case. This is a subtle combination. In
fact, a key aspect of crime scene examination is the detection and
recognition of relevant traces [23]. The detection process itself, and
the recognition of relevant traces, by deﬁnition, requires a priori
knowledge of different natures. Ignoring a forensic technique, or
how to apply it may lead the examiner to miss a latent trace: when
an object is retrieved under water, common sense will wrongly
orient to the idea that potential traces have been irremediably
washed. At another end, having hypotheses of criminal activities in
mind may help to undertake a selective search at the early stage of
crime scene processing, the end result being that it becomes easier
to recognise what is relevant.
This discussion supports that the different inference modes are
of a scientiﬁc nature akin to scientiﬁc research and discovery
[5,20,24–27]. It deserves high intellectual grade training, intensive
research and explicit modelling. This recognition is necessary if we
wish to appropriately integrate contextual knowledge of various
natures, and control its potentially undesirable side effects.
Controlling structures and preserving scientists from contextual
effects are in contradiction with the global aim of detecting and
recognising high quality and quantity of relevant traces. Therefore
desirable control should rely on demonstrable critical thinking and
the necessity to process crime scene with a scientiﬁc attitude. This
goes against ‘‘on the job’’ technical training of non-scientiﬁc
personnel.
6. Proposition: the four dimensions of knowledge
We propose a formalisation of management and crime scene
processing methodologies with an architecture that decomposes
knowledge used into four dimensions. For illustration purposes,
we consider a case that has been reported to the police.We assume
two different levels of decisions where knowledge of the current
environment can be used to guide crime scene examiners
activities, whatever the organisation: the decision to attend or
not a particular scene for searching traces (1) and actual decisions
made for processing the scene itself (2).
6.1. The decision to attend the scene—ﬁrst case assessment
We assume that, when deciding whether attending the crime
scene, or the extent of the intervention, the crime scene
investigator will interpret the case in the context of (1) the
strategic environment, (2) the criminal environment, (3) the
immediate environment and (4) the physical environment (see
Fig. 3).
Two criteria are assessed in the decision making process from a
forensic perspective: the relative importance of the case and the
chance to detect traces. Main decision points can be described
independently of speciﬁc organisations, but obviously, the way the
intervention is organised and the subsequent background of the
deciders, can greatly inﬂuence what is decided in function of
speciﬁc situations.
The so-called strategic environment is constituted by the
organisation, available resources in terms of available technology
and knowledge, a set of management rules, priorities and
strategies devised by the management following an intelligence-
led philosophy. The importance of the case becomes relative to the
policy and is mainly assessed at this level. For instance, to increase
credibility, to improve the police image, or to impact on the
security feeling, itmay be decided to increase the attendance levels
at certain types of scenes of high volume crime. In this sense, each
case of this type is given a high importance. The legal dimensions
appear here for instance when the security strategy consists of
ﬁlling the judicial gap. It is ﬁrst seen in thismodel as ameans rather
than an end. But forensic science remains an aid to manage
Fig. 2. Description of the whole reconstruction process through hypothetico-
deductive reasoning process. A criminal transfers traces that are detected and
recognised by scene of crime investigators. From evidence collected alternative
hypotheses and propositions are drawn. They are then tested.
5 Laurence Sterne wrote it 250 years ago: ‘‘It is the nature of an hypothesis, when
once a man has conceived it, that it assimilates everything to itself, as proper
nourishment; and, from the ﬁrstmoment of your begetting it, it generally grows the
stronger by every thing you see, hear, read, or understand.’’ Laurence Sterne, The Life
and Opinion of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman vol. II, ch. 19, cited at: http://
www.tristramshandyweb.it/ (last access 12th October 2009).
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evidence including to conﬁrm the strategic objectives, and
ultimately to determine imputability. The collection of data also
must follow increasingly formalised rules with respect to civil
liberties. This particular aspect becomes increasingly important
with the proliferation of electronic traces.
Another typical strategy consists of targeting proliﬁc criminals
or managing hot-spots. This is done in accordance to knowledge
about the criminal environment which, itself, informs about the
current structure of the criminality and about current crimino-
genic hot-spots. Are proliﬁc criminals active? If the involvement of
speciﬁc proliﬁc offenders is detected, theremay be signs that a new
case is the result of their activities, and this must inﬂuence the
decision to attend the scene.
These signs can result from the evaluation of the immediate
environment: what type of house has been burgled, in which street,
when, how, what was removed? Together, the chance of detecting
traces can also be integrated into factors of decision by evaluating
traces collected in relation to other cases of the same series: does
the burglar operate in a way that direct the collection of new
traces? One may also consider that traces collected in this speciﬁc
series are already sufﬁcient as potential evidence in court, if the
burglar is subsequently arrested. This judicial attitude may
contradict the processing of intelligence-led strategies, if it is
not integrated as a whole, by considering punishment as an
efﬁcient mean of disrupting criminal activities.
Forensic scientists are more familiar with the last dimension:
the physical environment. Studies regularly report information
about the chance to detect traces on given supports, according to
knowledge about traces, transfer mechanisms or persistence: for
instance, what are surfaces offering the best chance of successful
trace recovery according to the supposed activity of the offender
and the assumed conditions of preservation? If the environment of
the case opens good opportunities for detecting traces, this may
inﬂuence the decision. This actual processing represents a
particular thorough technical assessment of the case itself, while
participating to the decision to attend the scene.
6.2. Detection and collection
A valid approach to crime scene must also consider a series of
additional speciﬁc and specialised pieces of knowledge thatmay be
highly variable. The nature of this relevant knowledge should be
clearly distinguished and coherently organised within a frame-
work. The proposed model decomposing crime scene into
strategic, criminal, immediate and physical dimensions enables
to connect intelligence to crime scene processing, while still
integrating other relevant crime theories and forensic science
background into the task.
The strategic environment informs about how much resources
are available to effectively process the scene. For instance how
much time can be dedicated to this speciﬁc scene and subse-
quently how detailed the processing should be. This evaluation
also concerns what techniques should reasonably be used,
according to their portability, simplicity, or cost. This continuous
assessment should be adapted in relation to what is observed at
the scene.
The current environment can potentially help classify the case
into an already known activity. For instance, if a case is recognised
as the plausible result of the activity of a serial offender, all the
knowledge available about the activity of that offender may be
important to process the case. Difﬁcult to see or detect, poor
quality traces may be observed just because one knows what to
look for.
The reconstruction process must also rely upon careful
interpretation of the immediate environment where the crime
took place. A set of approaches developed in criminology can help
interpret this environment: the so-called situational approaches.
These approaches were originally aimed at crime prevention by
considering crime as the product of the immediate environment.
They converge towards the idea that the conditions for a crime to
occur are very speciﬁc and strongly depend on the motivation and
abilities of the offender (perceived risks, expected gain, effort,
knowledge or resources), as well as the characteristics of the
victims within a speciﬁc poorly protected environment that make
the victim vulnerable and his or her values attractive. Changing
this immediate environment would remove opportunities for
crime to occur.
Based on postulates such as ‘‘whatever one’s criminal inclina-
tions, one cannot commit a crime without overcoming its physical
requirements’’ [28], these approaches have also proven to be
relevant for detecting and analysing crime problems [29]. In fact,
this ‘‘chemistry’’ or opportunities can be helpfully studied in order
to look for concentration of crimes in time and place, as well as for
explaining the existence and developments of these clusters [28].
Generally, manual for crime scene processing stress that scene
of crime specialists should ‘‘think thief’’ or ‘‘take the place of the
offender’’ when they process the scene. This is typically an attitude
that situational approaches have successfully developed and for
which a powerful framework takes into account four constitutive
elements: the immediate environment, the offender, the target
(victim), and the capable guardians. The speciﬁcity of possible
situations where crime occurs, limit possibilities to develop modi
operandi. As a result, situational approaches are very promising for
imagining offenders activities at the scene, typically through a
selective search such as: how was the environment conﬁgured at
the time of the crime? what are the guardians (neighbour
surveillance, technical alarms, lock protections, etc.)? and what
are the vulnerabilities of the target at the time of the crime?
The different dimensions of the contextual knowledge that
make the connection of crime scene intervention and processing
with intelligence-led style of policing are summarised in Table 1
and Fig. 4.
From this analysis, a useful additional concept makes the links
with the physical level: the focus on ‘‘contact points’’ between
offender, the scene and victims. It is particularly useful in
uncovering the speciﬁc physical interactions, when the obvious
(footwear/ﬁngermarks/DNA) have not been found.6 At this point,
crime scene examiners use their knowledge of the physical nature
of traces, transfer mechanisms, persistence of traces under the
known circumstances of the case, and available technologies.
Fig. 3. Boxes represent the different environments to take into consideration. In
italic, the different disciplines and theories which the activity relies upon. Finally,
the institutional and legal frameworks intervenes at each levels, as they impose
constraints on how to carry out the task, andmay alsomotivate some activity when
they are considered as a means in a security strategy.
6 The concept of ‘‘contact point’’ has been coined by one of the anonymous
reviewer of this paper. It was probably formalised at National Crime Faculty in UK
from around 1998 onwards.
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6.3. Examples
Illustrations of the combined use of the four levels are already
manifold in the implicit or explicit practice. The interpretation of
the series of burglaries presented at the beginning of this paper in
the perspective of this integrative approach highlights evident
ruptures in the reasoning process.
Another typical example illustrates how the proposed decom-
position formalise implicit practices. When stolen cars are
recovered, most often than not, standard operating procedures
tell that they must not be investigated by crime scene examiners.
However, when intelligence suggests a connection between the car
stolen and, for instance, a serious crime or an important crime
series, standard operating procedures are overruled and eventually
the car recovered will be the object of an examination. This
typically often leads to the collection of relevant traces belonging
to the whole criminal activity, because cars form a very favourable
environment for traces transfers and preservation.
These kinds of examples are collected in several research
projects [30,31]. In [31] we presented the case of a series of
burglaries in detached houses perpetrated during the night. The
detection of the series by the crime intelligence unit has
stimulated the management to give priority to the case by
allocating more resources. On their side, crime scene examiners
reconsidered their procedures of intervention at the scene for
such cases. They analysed situational factors and imagined
possible physical contacts resulting from the speciﬁc modus
operandi of the burglar. These considerations changed the
approach of similar cases and improved quality and quantity of
traces collected. As a corollary, the global information available on
the series brought by crime and forensic intelligence supported
investigative efforts and led to the resolution of the case. In similar
circumstances, the quality and quantity of traces collected, and
consequently the understanding of the series are also solid
arguments when delicate decisions are taken in the course of the
investigation.
Table 1
Knowledge dimensions for the ﬁrst (most often than not ‘‘remote’’) assessment of the case and for supporting the processing of the scene itself. From the assessment, the
intensity and nature of the intervention will be decided. The knowledge gained will also support the detection and collection of traces.
First case assessment Actual processing
Importance of the case Chance to collect traces Detection and collection
Physical Assessment of physical damages Assessing potential supports for traces,
technology and knowledge needed
Identifying supports for traces
Situational Assessment of the seriousness Imagining paths and modus operandi Targeting the search through reconstruction of the path and
modus operandi
Intelligence The case relative to the criminal
situation
Existence of previous similar cases
and results obtained
Using knowledge of previous similar cases and successes
obtained
Strategic Degree of priority in relation to
policing strategies
Availability of technology and knowledge Using available resources (time, technologies, knowledge,
human)
Fig. 4. Intelligence is central to decision making. In our model, a new case is assessed according to an evaluation of the physical environment and an analysis of the situation
(circumstances) where the crime was perpetrated. At a next level, the new case is interpreted according to the current knowledge about the criminal environment. Finally,
this assessment is completed by strategic considerations. This global reasoning process supports the decisions of determining the intensity and nature of the intervention
(from none to extensive crime scene investigation). More generally, within an intelligence-led framework, this process supports the decision of the response to give to the
situation, from strategies to concrete operational repressive or preventive measures. Bringing criminals to justice is one amongst other possible measures.
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These are typical contribution of forensic intelligence within a
whole system that intends to detect problems and make informed
decision at every level of the organisation.
7. Conclusion
From the ﬁrst part of this paper, we derived that there is a
necessity for the forensic science community to take into account
the various constraints imposed both by security and justice tasks.
These constraints increase the complexity of the forensic science
position, and drive the forensic science community to accept to
take more responsibility in a security perspective. In our opinion,
this realisation infers that important challenges are around the
corner; and addressing these challenges will require from the
forensic science community to go far beyond recent recommenda-
tions for a simple better control of forensic procedures.
The proposed framework intends to make a step towards
integrating and structuring intelligence aspects in the methodol-
ogy and make explicit what is today exploited by individuals
implicitly using environmental knowledge. In this perspective, the
strategic, crime intelligence, situational and physical dimensions
delineate this logic of crime scene investigation.
This model belongs to a long-term formalisation project that
relates to the use of forensic case data in a truly intelligence and
security perspective, as well as the manifold potential use of
forensic case data in speciﬁc investigations [6,31–35]. It extends
recent empirical studies investigating a better understanding of
the logical mechanisms of crime scene examination [4,5,36,37].
Current research is ongoing in order to go beyond successful
examples and should empirically test the proposed model [30].
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